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Within the past fifteen years several broadly-focused articles have
identified general constitutional limits, under the due process clause, on
presumptions and inferences created by statute or applied by courts in
trying criminal cases.1 Recently, in County Court of Ulster County, New York
v. Allen,2 the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the evidentiary
devices of inferences and presumptions and labeled them "a staple of
our adversary system of factfinding. '" 3 This suggests that to unreasona-
bly curtail the use of circumstantial evidence in the factfinding process
would place an intolerable burden on prosecutors in their efforts to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet, notwithstanding the neces-
sary evidentiary role for presumptions and inferences in the criminal
justice process, the Court has acknowledged often-stated requirements of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. A.B. Cornell Univer-
sity, 1968; J.D. Harvard University, 1972. The author gratefully acknowledges the research
assistance of Andrew Emerson, a member of the Texas Bar.
I See Allen, The Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal
Cases after Patterson v. New York, 76 MIcH. L. REv. 30 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Allen,
Restoration]; Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, The Supreme Court and the Substantive Law--an Examria-
tion of the Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 55 TEx. L. REv. 269 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Allen, Limits of Legitimate Intervention]; Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions and Due
Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165 (1969); Jeffries & Stephan,
Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325 (1979); Nesson,
Reasonable Doubt and Pemissive Inferences: The Value of Complexit, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1187
(1979).
2 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
3 Id. at 156.
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due process: persons accused of crimes must be presumed innocent and
every element of a crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.4
This article will analyze approaches taken by various federal cir-
cuits in reviewing a microcosm of our criminal justice system-aggra-
vated bank robbery convictions-first, by identifying the substantive
criminal law issues; second, by surveying established due process analy-
sis; and, finally, by relating that analysis to prosecutions under the Fed-
eral Bank Robbery Act. 5
The examination below of different judicial constructions of the ag-
gravated offense subsection of the Federal Bank Robbery Act will reveal
occasional circumvention of due process requirements through the ap-
plication of permissive and conclusive presumptions.6 This Article will
conclude, moreover, that the law interpreting this brief, relatively sim-
ple, and frequently litigated statute is substantially unsettled and that,
in this particular area of criminal justice, the constitutionally-mandated
separation between the executive and judicial branches may be eroding.
If, as Chief Justice Burger recently warned, our system of justice may
literally break down within 20 years,7 the breakdown could be initiated
by such a publicly-supported erosion.
II. IDENTIFYING THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW QUESTIONS
Prompted by the increasing rate of "one of the most serious forms
of crime committed by organized gangsters who operate habitually from
one state to another," in 1934 Congress enacted the Federal Bank Rob-
4 See County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979); Barnes v.
United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); United States
v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
5 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1976). The Act provides inter alia:
(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes or attempts to take, from
the person or presence of another any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care,
custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings
and loan association. . . . [s]hall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
than twenty years, or both.
(b) Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or
money or any other thing of value exceeding $100 belonging to, or in the care, custody,
control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan
association, shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both.
(d) Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in subsec-
tions (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any
person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.
6 See United States v. Shelton, 465 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Cooper, 462
F.2d 1343 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972); United States v. Marshall, 427
F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1970); Baker v. United States, 412 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1969),cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1018 (1969).
7 N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1982, at 15, col. 2.
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bery Act.8 Section 2113(a) of the statute, which today exists in relevant
part substantially unchanged, prohibits the taking "by force and vio-
lence, or by intimidation" of anything of value from a federally-insured
bank or savings and loan association. 9 This federal offense is punishable
by a sentence of up to 20 years imprisonment.' 0 Furthermore, section
2113(d) of the Act provides that if, in the commission of such a bank
robbery by force or intimidation, the perpetrator commits an assault or
places the life of any person in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous
weapon, the maximum penalty for the offense increases to a maximum
of 25 years imprisonment."
In recent years, the Bank Robbery Act has been the subject of in-
creased, if ambiguous, attention in the appellate courts. Indeed, the
statute is one of the most frequently litigated sections in Title 18.12 The
Justice Department has routinely invoked both sections 2113(a) and
2113(d) of the Act to prosecute all persons connected with particular
robberies for the "aggravated" offense.13 Courts have reinforced this
practice by liberally construing both the elements of the offense in jury
instructions and the requirements of proof and burden of persuasion to
affirm the conviction, under section 2113(d) and 18 U.S.C. § 2,14 of per-
sons who, for example, never entered the bank or persons who did not
participate in the use of an objectively dangerous weapon.15
Until recently, few courts rigorously applied a due process analysis
designed to determine whether particularly-favored jury instructions
permit or mandate presumptions which conflict with the "presumption
8 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970); see, H.R. REP. No. 1461, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
9 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).
10 Id.
"1 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d).
12 See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUsTICE STATISTICS Table 5.19 at 406-07 (Flanagan, Van Alstyne & Gottfredson
eds. 198 1). Of a total of 25,792 defendants prosecuted by the federal government for felonies
during the year ending June 30, 1980, 1,329 were charged with bank robbery. Id.
13 United States v. Marshall, 427 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. DePalma, 414
F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1046 (1969); Lewis v. United States, 365 F.2d
672 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1966). The terms "aggravated" offense and "en-
hanced" penalty section often are used interchangeably with reference to 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d)
and sometimes § 2113(e). See, e.g., Note, The Federal Bank Robbery Act-The Problem of Separate
,
Punishable Offenses, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 101, 113, 117 (1976).
14 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), the federal aiding and abetting statute, is discussed in depth in
the majority and dissenting opinions in Bailey v. United States, 416 F.2d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
t5 United States v. Marshall, 427 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Lewis, 365
F.2d 672 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1966); Wagner v. United States, 264 F.2d 524
(9th Cir. 1959). For further discussion, see infia notes 122-24 and accompanying text. See also
Note, The Inoperable Gun as a Dangerous Weapon Under Michigan's Felonious Assault Statute, 1981
DET. C. L. REV. 909.
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of innocence" standard, 16 or whether the government's evidence rele-
vant to the "lives in jeopardy" or "assault" element of section 2113(d)
has met a due process "reasonable doubt" standard.' 7 In a somewhat
unexpected recent development, however, several appellate courts re-
viewing aggravated bank robbery convictions have acknowledged the
possibility that accused bank robbery participants are not being ac-
corded due process of law as that principle has evolved in other criminal
law contexts.' 8 The relatively few reversals of convictions can be under-
stood, perhaps, as narrowly-focused applications of the basic observation
by Justice Frankfurter that, "the history of liberty has largely been the
history of observance of procedural safeguards."' 9
Several 1982 decisions illustrate open disagreement among courts
regarding the proper application of section 2113(d). 20 This disagree-
ment focuses primarily on two questions having traditional criminal law
overtones: (1) whether an unarmed accomplice who plans or partici-
pates in a bank robbery can be presumed to have known that the princi-
pals literally would endanger lives during the robbery; and (2) whether
a jury properly may presume from evidence that a potentially danger-
ous weapon or device displayed during a bank robbery was in fact capa-
ble of inflicting serious injury and, if so, whether such a presumption is
rebuttable by evidence that the weapon was inoperable or otherwise not
dangerous.
In United States v. McCaskill,2 1 the appellant, a "getaway" driver
who remained outside the bank while his accomplices carried out the
robbery, was convicted of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) and 18
U.S.C. § 2. He admitted his participation in the robbery but sought a
jury instruction stating that the government must prove not only that
the defendant knew that a bank was to be robbed and that the
defendent became associated with and participated in that crime, but
also that the defendant knew that the criminals were armed and in-
tended to use their weapons, and that he intended to aid them in that
16 See, e.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978). But see Kentucky v. Whorton, 570
S.W.2d 627 (Ken. 1978), rev'dper curnam, 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
17 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); see also
Nesson, supra note 1, at 1212-13.
18 United States v. McGaskill, 676 F.2d 995 (4th Cir. 1982) (Ervin, J., dissenting); United
States v. Longoria, 569 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Sanborn, 563 F.2d 488 (1st
Cir. 1977); United States v. Short, 493 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 (1974);
United States v. Methvin, 441 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1971).
19 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
20 Compare United States v. McGaskill, 676 F.2d 995 (4th Cir. 1982), with United States v.
Short, 493 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 (1974); see also United States v.
Bennett, 675 F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Crouthers, 669 F.2d 635 (10th Cir.
1982).
21 676 F.2d 995 (4th Cir. 1982).
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respect. McCaskill based his appeal, first, on the trial court's failure to
give such an instruction and, second, on the trial court's decision to give
an alternative instruction authorizing a conviction for aiding in the ag-
gravated offense based on evidence that appellant had generally associ-
ated himself with the bank robbery.22
In effect, the appellant argued a common principle of criminal law:
elements of a criminal offense as defined by a statute which contains
enhanced penalty provisions may have multiple or variable mens rea re-
quirements, and the state must prove each relevant mens rea element be-
yond a reasonable doubt.23 While the aiding and abetting section
requires proof of specific intent,24 the aggravated offense subsection,
2113(d), requires additional proof that lives were placed in jeopardy. 25
Thus, it logically follows that proof of mens rea must focus on the aggra-
vated offense section to sustain a conviction under that section of Title
18. If the appellant reasonably argued that the government had not
introduced evidence sufficient to prove his specific intent to aid in plac-
ing lives in jeopardy, then he would be entitled to a jury instruction
containing that theory.26
Nevertheless, in a split decision the Fourth Circuit affirmed McCas-
kill's conviction. The majority relied heavily upon Federal Bureau of
Investigation (F.B.I.) testimony that the appellant had confessed to hav-
ing knowledge of his accomplice's possession of guns prior to the rob-
bery. Thus the majority held that no legitimate jury question was
presented concerning proof of appellant's mens rea.27 Dissenting Judge
Ervin disagreed with the majority's assumption that the government's
proof of the appellant's knowledge concerning the use of weapons was
unrefuted. 28 In Judge Ervin's view, the appellant's trial testimony con-
flicted with the F.B.I. testimony, thus creating a valid issue for jury de-
termination and requiring a relevant instruction.29 Of particular
22 Id. at 997.
23 See generally Westerfield, The Mens Rea Requirement of Accomplice Liability in American Crimi-
nal Law--Knowledge or Intent, 51 Miss. L. REv. 155 (1981).
24 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) provides:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever wilfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or
another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.
25 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever, in committing, or in at-
tempting to commit, any offense defined in subsections (a) and (b) of this section. . . puts in
jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both."
26 United States v. Short, 493 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 (1974);
United States v. Bosch, 505 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1974).
27 676 F.2d at 999.
28 Id. at 1005 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 1004 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
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interest is the assumption by both the majority and dissent that, for a
conviction to be valid under section 2113(d), the jury had to find be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly aided an armed,
as opposed to unarmed, bank robbery. Thus, both the majority and
dissent undermine the traditional instruction, which had been given by
the trial court and challenged on appeal.3 0
Recognition that the government must submit proof and that the
trial court must adequately charge the jury regarding the aggravation
element of the Federal Bank Robbery Act under traditional principles
of accomplice liability leaves open the question of exactly what consti-
tutes that aggravating element: what exactly did Congress mean by the
"dangerous weapon" and "lives in jeopardy" terms used in section
2113(d)? Two recent decisions, United States v. Bennett 3 and United States
v. Crouthers,32 suggest that the Fourth and Tenth Circuits take a flexible
view of the statute, looking beyond the apparently straightforward "ob-
jective" meaning of those terms to approve jury instructions and uphold
convictions where the defendants appeared to have used intimidating
weapons, but had not directly placed lives in jeopardy because their
weapons were not actually capable of inflicting injury. In both cases,
the defendants were convicted of violating section 2113(d) and appealed
on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to convict. In each
case, not only did the prosecutor fail to introduce evidence that weapons
used in the course of the robbery could have inflicted injury, but, in
addition, the defendant proved that the weapons were unloaded (and
were not used or threatened to be used as a club or to physically as-
sault).33 Both the Fourth and Tenth Circuits, recognizing the existence
of contrasting views, rejected the "objective" test 3 4 for determining
whether a weapon was dangerous and whether lives were placed in jeop-
ardy by the defendant's use of the weapon. These courts looked instead
30 The instruction, identified as the accepted instruction in the Fourth Circuit, was as
follows:
"The Court instructs you that in order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is
necessary that the accused, that is, the defendant in this case, willfully associated himself
in some way with the criminal venture, that is, the bank robbery, and willfully partici-
pated in it as he would in something he wishes to bring about, that is to say that he
willfully seeks by some act or omission of his own to make the criminal venture succeed
and that an act is willfully done if done voluntarily and intentionally and with specific
intent to do something the law forbids.
Id. at 997.
31 675 F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1982).
32 669 F.2d 635 (10th Cir. 1982).
33 Bennett, 675 F.2d at 598; Crouthers, 669 F.2d at 638.
34 The objective test requires proof that the weapon involved was actually capable of
inflicting injury, i.e., that the gun was loaded. Bennett, 675 F.2d at 599; Crouthers, 669 F.2d at
639.
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at (1) the victim's subjective perception of the situation,3 5 and (2) the
potential consequences for the victim of intervention by police or
others.36 Both decisions affirmed the convictions without reference to
parallel state law or the legislative history of the Bank Robbery Act,
thus holding that the minimum necessary conduct violative of section
2113(a) was, without more, usually also violative of section 2113(d).
In McCaskill the appellate court thus effectively instructed the jury
to presume from the fact that a defendant aided in a robbery the addi-
tional element that the defendant knowingly aided in placing lives in
jeopardy during the robbery. In Bennett and Crouthers, the lower courts
authorized a presumption that the use of apparently dangerous weapons
during a robbery implies that the weapons actually were dangerous and
literally placed lives in jeopardy; the courts then disregarded evidence
that arguably would have rebutted that presumption. The following
section of this Article will explore recognized limitations upon the use of
similar presumptions.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS UPON THE USE OF
PRESUMPTIONS
The terms inference and presumption are often used interchangea-
bly. Their use has been defined as "a standardized practice, under
which certain facts are held to call for uniform treatment with respect to
their effect as proof of other facts."13 7 Whether the proof of fact A gives
rise to the inference or presumption of fact B is dependent upon fact A's
probative value regarding the existence of fact B. 38 Presumptions gener-
ally are classified as permissive, mandatory, or conclusive. 39 Permissive
presumptions permit, but do not compel, the factfinder to assume the
35 Crouthers, 669 F.2d at 639.
36 Bennett, 675 F.2d at 599.
37 E. CLEARY, V. BALL, R. BARNHARDT, K. BROUN, G. Dix, E. GELLHORN, R.
MEISNHOLDER, E.F. ROBERTS, &J.W. STRONG, McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 342, at 803 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]. It
should be noted that in this quotation McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE intended only to define
the term presumption. In later discussing the evidentiary device implemented in cases such as
United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1954), and Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398
(1970), the work labels the device as a permissible inference-a particular subcategory of
presumptions. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 346, at 831.
In regard to the frequent synonymous use of the terms presumption and inference, note
the majority opinion of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979), where the terms
inference and presumption are used without attempt to distinguish the two as unique eviden-
tiary devices.
38 See 9 J.H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2491 (3rd ed. 1940).
39 Note, The Unconstitutionality of Statutog
, 
Cn'minal Presumptions, 22 STAN. L. REV. 341, 342-
43 (1970).
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existence of the presumed fact upon proof of the underlying fact.40
Mandatory presumptions require assumption of the presumed fact's
existence following a finding of proof of the underlying fact, at least
until evidence is offered to rebut that presumption. 4 1 Conclusive pre-
sumptions foreclose argument on the presumed fact once the underlying
fact is established.42
For decades the Supreme Court has struggled to define the due pro-
cess requirements imposed upon the use of presumptions in the eviden-
tiary process. 43 A continuously recurring question concerns the strength
of the probative link between the underlying and presumed facts. The
Court has established more stringent standards for the testing of
mandatory and conclusive presumptions because they have greater im-
pact on the fact-finding process. 44 In Ferry v. Ramsgy, 4 5 Justice Holmes
set forth what is commonly known as the "greater-includes-the-lesser"
test for the validity of presumptions.46 The test holds that if a legisla-
ture could in conformity with due process eliminate a particular sub-
stantive element of a crime and thereby find guilt or impose criminal
liability without proof of that element, then the State would be justified
in presuming the given element and requiring the defendant to shoulder
the burden of rebutting its existence.47 Thus, the legislature's greater
power to eliminate an element of a crime and nevertheless impose pun-
ishment included the lesser power to presume the existence of that ele-
ment upon proof of some underlying element. 48
The Supreme Court rejected the "greater-includes-the-lesser" rule
fifteen years later in Tot v. United States.49 Tot involved a conviction
under the Federal Firearms Act,50 which prohibited individuals previ-
ously convicted of crimes of violence from receiving firearms or ammu-
nition through interstate or foreign commerce.5 1 The Court struck
down an accompanying statutory rule which deemed possession of a
40 Id. at 343.
41 Id. at 342-43.
42 Id. at 342.
43 See, e.g., County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979);
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965);
Western & Atlantic R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929); Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88
(1928); Mobile, J. & K.C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
44 Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 166-67.
45 277 U.S. 88 (1928).
46 See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 1, at 1336-37; see also Allen, Restoration, supra note 1.
47 Ferry, 277 U.S. at 94.
48 Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 1, at 1337.
49 319 U.S. 463, 473 (1943). But see Allen, Limits of Legitimate Intervention, supra note 1, at
286-90, contending that the "greater-includes-the-lesser" theory survives Tot; see also Nesson,
supra note 1.
50 15 U.S.C. § 902 (1938) (repealed 1968; current version at 18 U.S.C. § 922(c)(1) (1976)).
51 Tot, 319 U.S. at 464.
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firearm by a defendant to be presumptive evidence that the weapon was
received through interstate or foreign commerce. 52 While the Court did
not explicitly overrule the holding of Fergy v. Ramsq,53 it clearly applied
another test to determine the constitutionality of presumptions: the re-
quirement that a rational connection exist between the underlying fact
and the presumed fact.54 In rejecting the claim that a rational connec-
tion existed between the fact of possession of a weapon or ammunition
and its reception through means of interstate or foreign commerce, the
Court noted: "It is not too much to say that the presumptions created
by the law are violent, and inconsistent with any argument drawn from
experience." 55
The Court further refined Tot' "rational-connection" standard in a
series of cases initiated by United States v. Gainey.56 Jackie Gainey was
convicted under 26 U.S.C. § 560157 for illegal possession of a still and for
carrying on a distilling operation without having given a bond.58 The
statute included a permissive presumption that evidence of unexplained
presence at the site of an illegal still was a sufficient basis from which to
conclude that a defendant was carrying on the business of distilling.59
In concluding that the presumption satisfied the "rational-connection"
test of Tot, Justice Stewart commented: "Legislative recognition of the
implications of seclusion only confirms what the folklore teaches-that
strangers to the illegal business rarely penetrate the curtain of se-
crecy."'60 In that same year, the Court, in United States v. Romano ,61 held
that unexplained presence at the site of a still would not sustain the
presumption that the defendant was in possession of the still.62 In dis-
tinguishing the Gainey decision, Justice White noted that the possession
of a still, unlike the general offense of carrying on the business of distil-
ling, is a specific offense which does not necessarily follow from presence
52 Id. at 469-70.
53 See Allen, Limits of Legitimate Intervention, supra note 1, at 286-90. But see Jeffries & Ste-
phan, supra note 1, at 1337 n.28.
54 Tot, 319 U.S. at 467. Actually the case represented a return to the "rational-connec-
tion" test which had been the rule before the Fey decision. See, e.g. , Mobile, j. & KC. R.R.,
219 U.S. at 43.
55 Tot, 319 U.S. at 468. The Court classified the presumption in Tot as mandatory in
nature, evidenced by the fact that a government argument based on convenience (defendant
has more ready access to evidence) was rejected as proper only in analyzing permissive infer-
ences. Id. at 469; see also Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 157-59 n.16 .
56 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
57 26 U.S.C. § 5601 (1976).
58 Gaine, 380 U.S. at 63-64.
59 26 U.S.C. § 5601(b).
60 Gaine, 380 U.S. at 67-68.
61 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
62 Id. at 138.
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at the site of a still.63
Leagr v. United States,64 decided by the Supreme Court in 1969, ap-
plied an even more stringent standard for the constitutional examina-
tion of presumptions. 65 Leary was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 176(a),
which prohibits the transportation of illegally imported marihuana.
The conviction was based upon the presumption that possession of mari-
huana would demonstrate the defendant's knowledge that it was ille-
gally transported.6 6 In reviewing its prior decisions on the issue of due
process requirements for the use of presumptions, the Court concluded:
The upshot of Tot, Gaine, and Romano is, we think, that a criminal
statutory presumption must be regarded as "irrational" or "arbitrary,"
and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial
assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the
proved fact on which it is made to depend.6 7
In finding the presumption of knowledge of illegal transportation from
possession constitutionally deficient, the Court explicitly reserved for
later decision the question of whether criminal presumptions are also
required to satisfy the criminal law "reasonable-doubt" standard, since
the presumption in question failed to meet even the "more-likely-than-
not" standard.68
The inevitable intersection of the Leaiy "more-likely-than-not" rule
for presumptions and the "reasonable-doubt" standard of proof re-
quired in a criminal proceeding occurred in In re Winshz,. 69 In review-
ing earlier decisions on the issue of burden of persuasion in criminal
cases, Justice Brennan for the majority concluded that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt had long been held to be constitutionally mandated
by the due process clause.70 Although Winship appeared to be nothing
63 Id. at 141. In Ulster County, the Court reviewed the Gainey and Romano decisions and
emphasized that the characterization of presumption as permissive or mandatory is deter-
mined by the judge's jury instructions concerning the effect of the presumption. 442 U.S. at
160. Whereas the jury instructions in Gainy clearly pronounced that the jury was not re-
quired to accept the presumption, 380 U.S. at 69-70, the instructions in Romano that the
defendant's presence at the still " 'shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize convic-
tion,'" 382 U.S. at 138, had the effect of creating a mandatory presumption. Ulster County,
442 U.S. at 157-59 n.16.
64 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
65 Id. at 36; see Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 1, at 1337.
66 Leagi, 395 U.S. at 30.
67 Id. at 36. In Ulster County, the Court reviewed the Lea
, 
decision, noting that the pre-
sumption involved in Leafy was a mandatory presumption. 442 U.S. at 159 n.17.
68 Lea,
' 
395 U.S. at 36 n.64.
69 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Winship held unconstitutional a New York statute specifying that
juveniles charged with committing delinquent acts could be found guilty merely by a pre-
pondereance of the evidence, instead of by the stricter standard of beyond a reasonable
doubt.
70 Id. at 361-65. Justice Brennan traced the requirement of a higher standard of proof in
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more than a restatement of the generally accepted requirements of bur-
den of persuasion in criminal cases, its ramifications were to be seen as
potentially revolutionary in nature with the decision of Mullan v. Wil-
bur7 l in 1975. Under the Maine statute, a defendant charged with mur-
der had to establish that he or she acted in the heat of passion in order
to reduce the homicide to manslaughter. 72 Noting the clear trend of
requiring the prosecution to bear the burden of proving the absence of
provocation, the Court concluded that the "reasonable-doubt" standard
of Winsh ib' constitutionally required that the state establish the absence
of provocation. 73 Particularly significant was the Court's response to the
State's contention that Wzinshi'b was inapplicable because Maine's crime
of felonious homicide did not include the absence of provocation as an
essential element of the crime: 7
4
Moreover, if Wznship were limited to those facts that constitute a
crime as defined by state law, a State could undermine many of the inter-
ests that decision sought to protect without effecting any substantive
change in its law. It would only be necessary to redefine the elements that
constitute different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear solely
on the extent of punishment. 75
The clear import of Mullang was that the requirements of Wishzp's
"reasonable-doubt" standard would extend to certain substantive ele-
ments of a crime, even if the states chose to eliminate those elements
from their definition of a given crime.76
Two years after Mullaney, the Court, in Patterson v. New York,77 se-
verely curtailed the apparently broad scope of the Winship doctrine as
elaborated in Mullaney. Patterson was convicted of second-degree mur-
der under a statute setting forth the elements of (1) "intent to cause the
criminal cases from ancient times, but noted that the specific terminology of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt "seems to have occurred as late as 1798." Id. at 361.
71 421 U.S. 684 (1975). For the immediate reaction of commentators to Mullang and
their conclusions that the decision would have a tremendous impact on the ability of the state
to shift burdens of proof, see Osenbaugh, The Constitutionality ofA4jFrmative Defenses to Oiminal
Charges, 29 ARK. L. REV. 429 (1976); Case Comment, Unburdening the Cnninal Defendant: Mul-
laney v. Wilbur and the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 390 (1976);
Note, Ajinmative Defenses and Due Process: the Constitutionality of Placing a Burden of Persuasion on a
Criminal Defendant, 64 GEO. L.J. 871 (1976).
72 The Maine manslaughter statute involved, ME. REV. STAT. ANN, tit. 17, § 2551 (1964)
(repealed 1975), read: "[W]hoever unlawfuly kills a human being in the heat of passion, on
sudden provocation, without express or implied malice aforethought . . . shall be punished
by a fine of not more than $1000 or by imprisonment for not more than 20 years ....
73 421 U.S. at 698.
74 Id. at 690.
75 Id. at 698.
76 See Tushnet, Constitutional Limitations of Substantive Criminal Law: An Examination of the
Meaning of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 55 B.U.L. REV. 775 (1975) (A'ullanty limits circumstances in
which state can find guilt in the absence of mens rea).
77 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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death of another person;" and (2) "caus[ing] the death of such person or
of a third person."7 8 Since malice aforethought was not included as an
element of the crime, the defendant contended that Mullaney required
the state to bear the burden of proof on any fact determining the
blameworthiness of an act or the severity of punishment to be imposed
for its commission. 79 In rejecting this reading of Mullaney, Justice White
for the majority countered that the Maine statute in Mullaney, as inter-
preted by that state's supreme court, had included malice aforethought
as an essential element of the crime, thus it included proof of the ab-
sence of provocation by implication. 80 The New York statute at issue in
Patterson, however, did not include malice aforethought as an element of
homicide, therefore the state was not required to prove the absence of
provocation.8 ' An accompanying footnote to the opinion particularly
enlightens the Court's motivation for refusing to liberally construe the
language of Mullangy:
There is some language in Mullany that has been understood as per-
haps construing the Due Process Clause to require the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt any fact affecting "the degree of criminal cul-
pability. . ." It is said that such a rule would deprive legislatures of any
discretion whatsoever in allocating the burden of proof, the practical effect
of which might be to undermine legislative reform of our criminal justice
system. . . . The Court did not intend Mullan to have such far-reach-
ing effect.82
Justice Powell, who authored the Mullaney decision, dissented in Patter-
son, obviously persuaded that the Court's fine distinctions drained all
vitality from the rationale of Mullaney.83
Commentators are divided on the conceptual significance of the
Mullaney and Patterson decisions. Some have advocated that the Court
in Winship established procedural requirements to which legislatures
must adhere in their drafting of criminal statutes.8 4 Under this view the
78 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975).
79 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 214.
80 Id. at 215.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 214-15 n.15.
83 Id. at 216-32. Justice Powell argued:
This explanation of the Mullany holding bears little resemblance to the basic rationale of
that decision. But this is not the cause of greatest concern. The test the Court today
establishes allows a legislature to shift, virtually at will, the burden of persuasion with
respect to any factor in a criminal case, so long as it is careful not to mention the nonexis-
tence of that factor in the statutory language that defines the crime. The sole require-
ment is that any references to the factor be confined to those sections that provide for an
affirmative defense.
Id. at 222-23 (Powell, J., dissenting).
84 See Underwood, The Thumb on the Scale of Justice: Burdens of Persuaion in Criminal Cases, 86
YALE L.J. 1299 (1977); Case Comment, AfJtnnative Criminal Defenses-The Reasonable Doubt Rule
in the Aftermath of Patterson v. New York, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 393 (1978).
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states are left virtually unrestricted in their definition of the substantive
elements of a crime; once the elements are established, however, the
state is prohibited from making an element nonexistent through a proce-
dural shifting of the burden of persuasion to the defendant.85 Others
have interpreted Winship as imposing substantive restrictions on legisla-
tors in drafting criminal statutes; they reject the view that Patterson alle-
viated these substantive limitations in favor of a formalistic procedural
approach. 86
The continuing vitality of the principle of WLinship, regardless of
85 Underwood, supra note 84, at 1317-30. Professor Underwood of Yale University
presents a comprehensive defense of the procedural view of Winship. Among the justifications
offered for the procedural interpretation are the frequent procedural checks implemented in
the Constitution on the criminal justice process and an assertion that the requirement that
the state bear the burden of proof on all elements of a crime prohibits inappropriate com-
promises in statutory drafting. No longer can legislatures resolve disagreements concerning
the substantive elements to be included in a crime by including the elements, but shifting the
burden of proving the absence of those elements to the defendant. Likewise, the procedural
technique of shifting the burden of proof on an essential element could possibly deceive mem-
bers of the public in their understanding of what conduct will give rise to guilt under any
given offense. Underwood, supra note 84, at 317-30.
86 See Allen, Restoration, supra note 1; Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 1. In advocating the
substantive interpretation of Winship, Mui/any, and Patterson, Jeffries and Stephan have
placed greater weight on a section of the majority opinion in Patterson where Justice White
stated:
We therefore will not disturb the balance struck in previous cases holding that the Due
Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the
elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged ...
This view may seem to permit state legislatures to reallocate burdens of proof by
labeling as affirmative defenses at least some elements of the crimes now defined in their
statutes. But there are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go in this
regard.
432 U.S. at 210 (emphasis added) (quoted in part in Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 1, at 1364).
A predominant criticism of the procedural approach to Mullane and Patterson is that its
practical effect is to provide no significant protection to a defendant in a criminal action since
the state reserves the "unconstrained discretion" in deciding what elements will be included
in the definition of an offense:
Winship's insistence on the reasonable-doubt standard is thought to express a preference
for letting the guilty go free rather than risking conviction of the innocent. This value
choice, however, cannot be implemented by a purely procedural concern with burden of
proof. Guilt and innocence are substantive concepts. Their content depends on the
choice of facts determinative of liability.
Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 1, at 1347. Thus, the defendant in a criminal action would
receive less protection because guilt would be found on the basis of fewer elements. Id. Simi-
lar arguments were present prior to Mullany and Patterson as debate centered on the issue of
whether the implementation of affirmative defenses, placing the burden of persuasion on a
defendant, conflicted with the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Compare
Ashford & Risinger, supra note 1, with Christie & Pye, Presumptions andAssumptions in the Crimi-
nal Law: Another View, 1970 DuKE L.J. 919. The argument as it then existed held that if a
state were compelled to bear the burden of persuasion on all affirmative defenses, the state
would eliminate various affirmative defenses to given crimes. This would ultimately have the
effect of leaving the accused with a lesser opportunity to demonstrate his innocence. Christie
& Pye, supra, at 936-37.
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whether it is perceived as a procedural or substantive limitation on
states in their criminal administration, is evidenced by the recent
Supreme Court decision of Sandstrom v. Montana .8 David Sandstrom was
charged with deliberate homicide under a Montana Statute.88 Despite
the defendant's vigorous assertion that he was guilty of a lesser offense
because he did not murder the victim "purposely or knowingly," the
trial judge nevertheless instructed the jury that "[t]he law presumes that
a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts."'8 9 In
overturning Sandstrom's conviction, the Supreme Court found the
judge's instructions constitutionally defective because the jury could
have interpreted the instruction as requiring the defendant to prove ab-
sence of intent once the State established that the slaying had taken
place.9°
The Supreme Court, in Barnes v. United States,9 1 indirectly addressed
the question whether tension is created by the Leafy standard that a
presumed fact flows "more likely than not" from a proven fact and by
the Winship principle that the prosecution must prove every element of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In Barnes, the Court was faced with a
conviction for the possession of United States Treasury checks stolen
from the mail.9 2 On the essential element of knowledge, the judge in-
structed the jury that the unexplained possession of stolen property was
a fact from which they could infer, in the light of other circumstances,
that the individual in possession knew the property to be stolen.93 In
assessing and upholding the validity of this presumption, Justice Powell
cited the earlier decisions of Leafy and Turner v. UnitedStates94 and made
87 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
88 Id. at 512. The statute involved was MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (1978).
89 Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 512-13.
90 Id. at 524; see generally Note, Presumptive IntentJuty Instructions after Sandstrom, 1980 Wis.
L. REV. 366.
91 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
92 Id. at 838.
93 Id. at 839-40.
94 396 U.S. 398 (1970). In Turner, the Court upheld the statutory inference of
"knowledge" of importation from the fact of possession of heroin because "'common sense'
... tells us that those who traffic in heroin will inevitably become aware that the product
they deal in is smuggled." Turner, 396 U.S. at 417. As Justice Brennan later observed, "The
basis of that 'common sense' judgment was, of course, the indisputable fact that all or virtu-
ally all heroin in this country is necessarily smuggled." Barnes, 412 U.S. at 853 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). In other words, in Turner the inference of knowledge followed directly from the
underlying fact of possession, because persons dealing in heroin can be presumed to know the
unambiguous fact of its foreign source.
On the other hand, the Court in Turner set aside a defendant's conviction for unlawful
possession of cocaine, striking down the same statutory inference of knowledge of importation
as applied to cocaine, because some cocaine is produced domestically and therefore, with
respect to cocaine, the inference did not even meet the "more likely than not" test. 396 U.S.
at 422-24. In effect, such a statutory inference regarding cocaine required the piling of infer-
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this observation on the constitutional test to be applied to presumptions:
"To the extent that the 'rational connection,' more likely than not,' and
'reasonable doubt' standards bear ambiguous relationships to one an-
other, the ambiguity is traceable in large part to variations in language
and focus rather than to differences of substance. ' 95 The Court in
Barnes concluded that the permissive inference of knowledge that the
checks were stolen from the mail, which arose from the unexplained pos-
session, met the "reasonable-doubt" standard and therefore the less
stringent "more-likely-than-not" standard as well.96
Justice Douglas argued in a vigorous dissent that the possession of
stolen checks does not permit an inference that the individual knew the
checks were stolen, even when scrutinized under the "more-likely-than-
not" standard.9 7 Justice Brennan, in a separate dissent, protested that
the Court's ruling directly contravened the Wfinship "reasonable-doubt"
standard because the jury could have found knowledge solely on the
basis of the inference, which clearly did not meet the standards previ-
ously established in Turner.98
The Barnes decision thus left undecided the question whether the
"reasonable-doubt" standard was constitutionally mandated in deter-
mining the validity of presumptions.9 9 The Court may have definitively
resolved the question in its most recent pronouncement on the issue of
presumptions, County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen.l°° In up-
holding a New York statute providing that the presence of a firearm in
an automobile is sufficient to support the inference of illegal possession
by all persons then in the vehicle,' 0 the Court held that permissive in-
ferences need not meet the "reasonable-doubt" standard for purposes of
fulfilling due process.'0 2 Concluding that permissive inferences need
only meet the Leay "more-likely-than-not" standard, Justice Stevens
noted that mandatory presumptions would not enjoy this lesser stan-
dard of probability. 0 3 The majority opinion prompted a dissent by jus-
ence upon inference: first, that the cocaine actually was imported, whereas some cocaine is
not imported, and second, that the defendant had knowledge of its source.
95 Barnes, 412 U.S. at 843.
96 Id. at 846-47.
97 Id. at 852 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 853-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 843-48.
t00 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
101 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(3) (McKinney 1967), cited in Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 142
n.1.
102 Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 166-67.
103 Id. In justifying this distinction Justice Stevens wrote for the majority:
Respondents' argument [that the reasonable doubt standard should be applied to per-
missive presumptions] again overlooks the distinction between a permissive presumption
on which the prosecution is entitled to rely as one not necessarily sufficient part of its
proof and a mandatory presumption which the jury must accept even if it is the sole
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tice Powell, joined by three other members of the Court, in which he
strongly criticized the majority's method for assessing whether the pre-
sumed fact of possession "more-likely-than-not" flowed from the pres-
ence of the weapon in the automobile. He asserted that the majority
erred in making the determination by considering additional evidence
offered in the trial on the element of possession.1 0 4 In the dissent's view,
the court should have analyzed the probability of possession by viewing
the principal fact alone, without references to accompanying circum-
stances, since the jury could have rejected all other evidence on the issue
of possession and still found the element of possession solely on the basis
of the permissible inference.10 5 Nor did the dissenters condone the ma-
jority's distinction between mandatory presumptions, which effectively
shift the burden of proof to the defendant, and permissive inferences,
which merely allow the jury to find the principal fact.10 6 No such dis-
tinction can be found in the Court's earlier pronouncements on the con-
stitutional requirements of inferences and presumptions. 107
The validity of the Court's bifurcated approach to permissive and
mandatory presumptions in Ulster County is certainly open to question on
due process grounds. 0 8  While it views mandatory presumptions as
shifting the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defendant inso-
far as the jury is required to find the presumed fact in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the Court perceives permissive inferences as
not shifting the ultimate burden of proof since the jury remains free to
reject the inference. 0 9 As one commentator has noted, the Court, in
evidence of an element of the offense. . . . There is no more reason to require a permis-
sive statutory presumption to meet a reasonable-doubt standard before it may be permit-
ted to play any part in a trial than there is to require that degree of probative force for
other relevant evidence before it may be admitted.
Id.
104 Id. at 168-77 (Powell, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 174-76.
106 Id. at 170-71.
107 Id. at 170 n.3. But see Gainey, 380 U.S. at 70, where the Court emphasized the fact that
the jury remained free to reject the inference and find the defendant not guilty as one ground
for upholding the presumption in question.
108 See Note, 57 U. DaT. J. URB. L. 389, 404-14 (1980). A separate and equally significant
constitutional question arising from the use of inferences is that of whether permissive infer-
ences infringe upon the defendant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. Infer-
ences which permit the jury to infer certain elements of a crime in the absence of explanation
to the contrary by the defendant arguably compel the defendant to testify in the absence of
evidence sufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Black noted this
infringement in his extensive dissenting opinion in Cainey, 380 U.S. at 87-88 (Black, J., dis-
senting). For an extensive discussion of the fifth amendment issues raised by the use of per-
missive inferences meeting a "more-likely-than-not" standard, see Nesson, supra note 1, at
1208-15. For an analysis of the Court's failure to address this fifth amendment problem in
Ulster County, see Note, supra, at 407.
109 Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 166-67.
[Vol. 74
1983] DUE PROCESS ANAL YSIS OF PRESUMPTIONS 379
assessing the validity of permissive presumptions in Romano and Leag,
applied a "two route" rule under which it is assumed that the presump-
tion was the sole basis of the jury's decision, even in the face of addi-
tional evidence sufficient to meet the standard of "reasonable doubt."110
If the Court had rigidly applied this "two route" rule to the presump-
tion present in Ulster County, perhaps it would have concluded that the
"more-likely-than-not" standard would allow a defendant to be con-
victed on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence. 1I One commen-
tator has further asserted that appliction of the "more-likely-than-not"
standard may allow a case to go to a jury without the prosecution meet-
ing the prerequisite that there be sufficient evidence on all elements to
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 2 Further criticism can be lev-
110 Note, supra note 108, at 410. The two route rule followed by the Supreme Court prior
to the Ulster County decision was premised on the notion that if the jury by reason of ;ts
instructions could have found guilt on one of two alternative routes, and one of the routes was
unconstitutional, then the conviction must be reversed. If a jury returns with a general ver-
dict, then it is impossible to know whether the jury found guilt on the basis of an unconstitu-
tional theory. See Nesson, supra note 1, at 1204-05.
Professor Nesson, in reviewing former Supreme Court decisions on the use of permissive
inferences, notes that the Court in Gaing avoided application of the two route rule by con-
cluding that the jury instructions there involved only charged that the jury consider presence
at a still as one of many factors in determining guilt. Id. at 1205. Yet, in reality, the instruc-
tion included the additional conflicting charge that the jury could convict by unexplained
presence at a distilling site. By disregarding the presence of this latter charge, the Court
avoided application of the two route rule. Id. at 1205-06. In the later decision of Romano, the
Court applied the two route rule to overturn a conviction for ownership of a still, inferred
from presence, despite the fact there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction for
ownership of the still. Id. at 1206. The two route rule was later restated in Leag. Id. at 1207-
09.
111 Note, supra note 108, at 410 (1980). Justice Stevens in the Ulster County majority opin-
ion rejected the notion that the jury could have concluded that the defendants were in posses-
sion of the weapons simply on the basis of the presence of the weapons in the automobile. To
use the permissive inference of possession, the jury necessarily had to accept the only evidence
offered to prove the guns were present in the automobile. The evidence offered was testimony
that the weapons were found in an open handbag, within plain view of the other occupants,
and possibly within the grasp of all occupants. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 163. This evidence
also ensured that the fact of possession "more-likely-than-not" flowed from the fact of pres-
ence of the weapons in the automobile. Since the jury could only find the underlying fact of
presence of the weapons in the automobile by accepting this evidence, it was impossible that
the jury could have found possession by the naked fact of presence of the weapons in the
automobile. The circumstances ensuring that the presumption flowed "more-likely-than-not"
necessarily had to be accepted by the jury in drawing the inference. Id. at 166 n.28.
While this argument may be said to support the conclusion that the presumption met a
"more-likely-than-not" standard, it still does not answer whether the defendants were con-
victed on a preponderance of the evidence. While the evidence in the earlier cases of Gain,
Barnes, and Turner clearly indicated that evidence supporting proof of guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt was present, no such facts were present in the Ulster County record. Thus the
possibility remains that the jury could have convicted the defendants in Ulster County on the
basis of an inference that barely met a "more-likely-than-not" standard. Note, supra note 108,
410-11.
112 See Note, The Unconstitutionality of Statutog Criminal resumptions, 22 STAN. L. REv. 341,
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elled at the Court's holding that the probability test for permissive infer-
ences must be determined in the light of all evidence offered in the case
on the presumed fact.' 1 3 If Justice Powell's contention that the jurors
could have rejected all other evidence on the presumed fact and found
the element of possession solely on the basis of the inference is valid,
then the Court's circumstantial case-by-case approach is rendered whol-
ly unacceptable.' 14
IV. PRESUMPTIONS AND THE FEDERAL BANK ROBBERY ACT
As suggested in the first section of this Article, one can see the prac-
tical applications of permissive, mandatory, and conclusive presump-
tions through an examination of additional cases arising under the
Federal Bank Robbery Act." 5 An initial question presented to courts in
such cases is whether a simple assault-placing a victim in reasonable
apprehension of harm regardless of whether one can actually inflict the
harm-will support a conviction under the "assault" alternative of sec-
tion 2113(d)'s aggravated offense provision. Although courts at one
time construed the section to require only evidence of a victim's subjec-
tive belief of danger to prove assault, the present trend, notwithstanding
Bennett and Crouthers, is to require evidence that the defendant actually
inflicted injury upon the victim."16 This construction of the statute gives
effect to each section of the Act, and thereby avoids making each viola-
349-50 (1970). That commentator cites the inference present in Leaty as an example. If 80%
of all marijuana in the United States were illegally imported, this would support a permissive
presumption of illegal importation from possession under a "more-likely-than-not" test; yet,
standing alone, it certainly should not permit a conviction requiring proof beyond a reason-
able doubt. Id. at 350 n.56.
113 Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 163-64.
114 But see Nesson, supra note 1, at 1222-25. Convictions based on permissive inferences
meeting only a "more-likely-than-not" standard can be prevented only if judges emphasize in
jury instructions that the probative value of any given inference is contingent upon its cir-
cumstantial context. In describing what is meant by this notion of properly framing pre-
sumptions in their circumstantial context, Nesson offers the following:
An example would be an instruction which informed the jurors that evidence of Gainey's
presence at the still was highly probative on the question whether he was operating the
still and could, when considered together with other circumstantial evidence which the
jurors might credit, warrant a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Such formula-
tions of permissive inferences would avoid any explicit authorization to draw a naked
inference from predicate to conclusion, and yet would accomplish the legislature's
objectives.
Id. at 1223. If such a rationale were applied to Ulster County, the decision would be wrong
since the judge's instructions in the case appeared to encourage the jury to find possession
based on the naked inference of presence of the weapons in the car, apart from other sur-
rounding circumstances. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 145. Yet the majority would counter that
in drawing the inference, the jury by implication based it on surrounding circumstantial evi-
dence of possession. Id. at 166 n.28.
115 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1976). For the text of the statute, seesupra note 5.
116 See Note, supra note 13, at 117-18.
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tion of section 2113(a) a violation of section 2113(d) also. ' 1 7
Courts have thus established the premise that a violation of section
2113(d) requires proof of either the defendant's physical assault or of the
defendant's objective capability to inflict deadly harm on a victim. A
related issue inevitably has arisen in these cases regarding the type of
evidence that will suffice to establish the essential element of actual abil-
ity to carry out a perceived threat. '18 The federal circuit courts and
district courts have adopted diverse views on this question. '1 9 In a sig-
nificant portion of cases arising under the Federal Bank Robbery Act,
courts have considered the defendant's own conduct-firing a shot from
a gun during a robbery-evidence of his or her ability to jeopardize
life.' 20 Under these circumstances, courts have justifiably concluded
that the defendant had objective capability to endanger life.121
A more difficult situation frequently arises in cases where the only
evidence demonstrating that the defendant had the actual capability to
inflict injury on persons present at the bank robbery is that the defend-
ant displayed a gun or some other ostensibly dangerous instrument.1 22
Defendants in these cases have often argued that an indictment for the
aggravated offense could not stand in the absence of independent evi-
dence demonstrating that the gun was loaded and operable.' 23 Courts,
for a variety of reasons, have rejected this argument and incorporated
evidentiary theories which will allow conviction under section 2113(d)'s
"in jeopardy" provision. A majority of courts have concluded that the
mere use of a gun in a robbery creates the permissive inference that the
117 Id.
118 See United States v. Beasley, 438 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866,
(1971); United States v. Marshall, 427 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Burger, 419
F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Roach, 321 F.2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1963). For a compre-
hensive listing of cases construing the enhanced penalty provision, see Annot., 32 A.L.R. FED.
279 (1977).
119 Compare United States v. Marshall, 427 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1970), and Baker v. United
States, 412 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1018 (1969) with United States v. Cady,
495 F.2d 742 (8th Cir. 1974), and Bradley v. United States, 447 F.2d 264 (8th Cir. 1971).
120 See United States v. Bamburger, 460 F.2d 1277 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S.
919 (1972); United States v.Cady, 495 F.2d 742 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Rizzo, 409
F.2d 400 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 911 (1969); United States v. Johnson, 401 F.2d 746
(2d Cir. 1968).
121 See United States v. Roach, 321 F.2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1963); United States v. Burger, 419
F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Beasley, 438 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir. 1971).
122 See United States v. Cooper, 462 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009
(1972); United States v. Marshall, 427 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1970); Thomas v. United States, 418
F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. DePalma, 414 F.2d 394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1046 (1969).
123 See United States v. Cady, 495 F.2d 742 (8th Cir. 1974); Baker v. United States, 412
F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1018 (1969); Wheeler v. United States, 317
F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1963); Wagner v. United States, 264 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1959).
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gun was loaded and operable. 24 The adoption of this permissive infer-
ence highlights the inherent tension between the Winshz' dictate that
every element of a crime be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and the
Ulster County "more-likely-than-not" standard for permissive presump-
tions. The majority rationale allows many cases to go to the jury on the
question of guilt for the aggravated offense when the only evidence
presented on the essential element of objective capability to inflict harm
is the apparent use of a gun. 25 Where the court uses the permissive
inference that the gun was loaded, a jury may conclude that an offense
under the aggravated offense subsection had taken place even under a
"more-likely-than-not" standard. 26 The response of the Ulster County
Court would be that while the permissive inference must meet only a
"more-likely-than-not" standard, the jury can find an aggravated of-
fense only if the totality of the evidence proves beyond a reasonable
doubt the essential element of actual capability to inflict harm. 127 Yet
courts frequently have upheld convictions under section 2113(d) when
the only evidence offered on the element of objective capability to inflict
harm was proof that the defendant displayed a gun. 28 While proof that
124 See United States v. Marshall, 427 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. DePalma,
414 F.2d 394 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1046 (1969); Lewis v. United States, 365 F.2d 672
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1966).
It should be noted that many of the courts adhering to the permissive inference rationale
found added support for the conclusion that the gun was loaded when the defendants pointed
the gun or threatened to shoot someone, although a shot was never actually fired. See United
States v. Thomas, 521 F.2d 76 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Newkirk, 481 F.2d 881 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1145 (1973); United States v. Shelton, 465 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1972).
125 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. This criticism could not be levelled as
strongly against decisions where additional evidence that the gun was loaded is present in the
form of threats to use the gun. See supra note 124.
126 In briefly commenting on the interrelationship of the permissive inference and the pros-
ecution's burden between proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, Justice Stevens noted in
the Ulster County decision:
Because this permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the
inference and does not shift the burden of proof, it affects the application of the "beyond
a reasonable doubt" standard only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way
the trier could make the connection permitted by the inference.
442 U.S. at 157.
127 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. As Justice Stevens stated in rejecting a
"reasonable-doubt" standard for permissive inferences:
There is no more reason to require a permissive statutory presumption to meet a reason-
able-doubt standard before it may be permitted to play any part in a trial than there is
to require that degree of probative force for other relevant evidence before it may be
admitted. As long as it is clear that the presumption is not the sole and sufficient basis
for a finding of guilt, it need only satisfy the test described in Leaq,.
Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 167.
128 See generally United States v. Marshall, 427 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v.
DePalma, 414 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1046 (1969); United States v.
Lewis, 365 F.2d 672 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1966).
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a gun was used may be said to "more likely than not" give rise to the
presumption that the gun was loaded and operable, it is a very different
matter to conclude that the gun was loaded and operable beyond a rea-
sonable doubt given the frequent use of unloaded guns, toy guns or
other seemingly dangerous-but in fact harmless-weapons in the rob-
bery of banks and other institutions.129 Thus, the permissive presump-
tion in such instances circumvents the Wzinship "reasonable doubt"
standard by allowing a jury to conclude that an aggravated offense has
taken place based on a preponderance of the evidence on the essential
element of objective capability to commit harm.
A second contravention of the Winsho' reasonable doubt standard
arguably occurs, as noted above, through the use of the permissive infer-
ence in cases where defendants are charged with aiding and abetting an
aggravated bank robbery. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in
United States v. Short ,130 however, enunciated the somewhat controversial
principle that proof must be made of the same elements necessary to
convict a principal in order to punish an aider and abettor. 131 Although
other courts have similarly stated that a person charged with aiding and
abetting a crime must have shared in the criminal intent of the princi-
pal, 132 they have rarely reversed aggravated offense convictions on that
ground. In stating what elements need be established to convict an indi-
vidual for aiding and abetting the aggravated offense under the Federal
Bank Robbery Act, those courts have concluded or assumed that the
government must demonstrate that the aider and abettor knew that a
dangerous weapon was to be used in the robbery.' 33 As in McCaskill,
however, the courts avoid reversals for other reasons.
On the other hand, some courts have adopted the permissive pre-
sumptions that use of a gun evidences that the gun was loaded, and that
129 See United States v. Cooper, 462 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir.), cerl. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972)
(use of a simulated bomb); Martin v. State, 133 Ga. App. 323, 211 S.E.2d 11 (1974) (hand in
pocket simulating a gun); People ex rel. Griffin v. Hunt, 267 N.Y. 597, 196 N.E. 598 (1935);
State v. Luckey, 69 Ohio Op. 2d 111, 322 N.E.2d 354 (1974) (use of a starter pistol); Cooper v.
State, 201 Tenn. 149, 297 S.W.2d 75 (1956) (use of toy pistol); Bartley v. State, 151 Tex.
Crim. 88, 205 S.W.2d 600 (1947) (hand in pocket simulating a gun). For a comprehensive
listing of robberies involving harmless weapons, see Annot., 81 A.L.R. 3RD 995 (1977).
130 493 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 (1974).
131 Id. at 1172.
132 See generally United States v. Longoria, 569 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Sanborn, 563 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Smith, 546 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1977).
133 United States v. Longoria, 569 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Sanborn, 563
F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Short, 493 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir.),cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1000 (1974); United States v. Methvin, 441 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1971).
While holding that it was essential that the defendant charged with aiding and abetting
have knowledge a weapon was to be used, the Sanbom court made the observation that "[a]n
aider and abettor need not know every last detail of the substantive offense. . . but he must
share in the principal's essential criminal intent." 563 F.2d at 491.
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aiding in a robbery suggests knowledge that a gun will be used.' 34 Ar-
guably, these presumptions violate Wzinship's principle that the prosecu-
tion must prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. 135 For a weapon to qualify as dangerous, it is necessary to infer
that the gun was loaded; to convict the aider and abettor, it should be
further proved that he or she knew that the gun was loaded and opera-
ble.1 36 Yet in requiring the aider and abettor only to possess knowledge
that a gun will be used in the robbery, courts construing section 2113(d)
have effectively eliminated the essential element that the aider know a
dangerous weapon is to be used. Some courts applying the permissive
inference rationale consider only loaded weapons capable of placing life
in jeopardy. Thus they should find an aider and abettor to have actu-
ally shared in the principal's specific intent of placing life in jeopardy
only when the aider and abettor knows that a gun is to be used, and that
the weapon will be loaded.1 37
134 See United States v. Bizzard, 674 F.2d 1382 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 305
(1982); United States v. Thomas, 521 F.2d 76 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Cady, 495 F.2d
742 (8th Cir. 1974). In Bizzard, the aggravated offense section was invoked against an un-
armed accomplice where the facts indicated that no shots had been fired by the armed co-
conspirator. At issue was the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the aggravating element
during the first trial, when raised on appeal from a second conviction after a reversal of the
first conviction. The appellant had claimed prior to the retrial that, in view of the insuffi-
ciency of evidence during the first trial, the double jeopardy clause precluded reprosecution
for the aggravated offense. During the first trial, the government had not shown that the con-
conspirator's weapon was operable or that the appellant had knowledge concerning its use or
dangerousness. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the evidentiary insufficiency contention with-
out elaboration. United States v. Bizzard, 615 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1980) (reversing first con-
viction), 493 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (denying pretrial motion to dismiss on double
jeopardy grounds), 674 F.2d 1382 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 305 (1982) (affirming
conviction upon retrial after reversal).
135 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
136 Courts have consistently required proof only that the aider and abettor knew that a
gun was to be used and have not required further proof that the aider and abettor knew the
gun was loaded and operable. See United States v. Longoria, 569 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1978).
137 If it is argued that the courts are inferring that the aider and abettor actually knew that
a gun would be used in the robbery and then further inferring his or her knowledge that the
gun was loaded, a separate problem potentially arises. The Supreme Court has forbidden, as
violative of due process, convictions which are reached "by piling inference upon inference."
Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 680 (1959) (quoting Direct Sales Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 703, 711 (1943)). The proscription of an inference upon an inference does not pre-
clude convictions based upon circumstantial evidence. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S.
121 (1954). Although some courts have ridiculed the prohibition of inference upon inference
as an "empty perjorative," see NLRB v. Camco, 340 F.2d 803, 811 (5th Cir. 1965), other
courts continue to recognize the vitality of the principle, as evidenced by the Eighth Circuit's
decision in United States v. Cobb, 558 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1977). There a conviction under 28
U.S.C. § 2113(d) for bank robbery by jeopardizing life was vacated. The evidence presented
on the issue of the use of a gun was that a teller saw "two dark holes that appeared to be
hollow protruding from the newspaper held by the robber." Id. at 488. From this it was first
inferred that a gun was wrapped in the newspaper and, secondly, it was inferred that the gun
was loaded. In vacating the conviction for jeopardizing life the court noted: "We know of no
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Perhaps in response to the constitutional argument noted above, a
second position articulated by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Baker v. United States' 38 construing section 2113(d) of the Federal Bank
Robbery Act has gained support. The Fifth Circuit was faced with the
familiar factual pattern in which a gun was used but never fired in the
robbery of a bank. 139 The defendants argued that proof of an aggra-
vated offense was inadequate since the prosecution did not establish that
the gun was loaded and thus capable of endangering life. 140 In rejecting
this argument, Judge Godbold for the majority held that a gun was "as
a matter of law" a dangerous weapon which objectively endangered life
even in the absence of proof that it was loaded. 4 1 Judge Godbold
reasoned:
The primary capacity of a gun to harm-by the discharge of a bullet from
the muzzle-plus its apparent capacity to carry out that harm, combined
with a highly charged atmosphere and the possibility of action by employ-
ees or others to prevent the robbery is a complex of circumstances in which
the person on the scene is in jeopardy of harm which may occur in any one
of various ways.14 2
The Fifth Circuit and other circuit courts have continued to follow the
Baker construction of the Federal Bank Robbery Act. 143
Several criticisms can be levelled at the Baker court's ruling that, as
a matter of law, a gun used in a robbery endangers life. First, the deci-
sion arguably contravenes the Fifth Circuit rule that past Circuit deci-
sions can only be overturned in en banc decisions. 4 4 In concluding that a
gun isper se a dangerous weapon for purposes of the Federal Bank Rob-
bery Act, the Baker panel was faced with the previous Fifth Circuit case
of Meyers v. United States. 45 There the court held an indictment alleging
that a pistol was used in a robbery insufficient to charge a violation of
the aggravated offense of jeopardizing life, since there was no allegation
that the gun was loaded.' 46 The Meyers court concluded:
case, however, which has permitted the jury to convict under § 2113(d) on the mere inference
that a partially concealed object was a loaded gun; this would unfairly compound inference
upon inference." Id. at 489.
138 412 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1018 (1969).
'39 Id. at 1070-71.
140 Id. at 1071-72.
141 Id. at 1072.
142 Id.
143 See United States v. Parker, 542 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Shelton, 465
F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Beasley, 438 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 866 (1971); United States v. Burger, 419 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1969); Thomas v. United
States, 418 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1969).
144 See Miller v. San Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc., 540 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1976); Davis v.
Estelle, 529 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1976).
145 116 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1940).
146 Id. at 603.
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The indictment mentions the use of a dangerous weapon, but does not say
that any assault was made with it, or that anyone's life was put in jeop-
ardy. The pistol may have been only exhibited and not pointed, it may
indeed not have been loaded, for only putting in fear is alleged and not
actually jeopardy or danger to the life of Jones.'14 7
The Baker decision distinguished Meyers on the ground that it "dealt
only with the requirements for a sufficient indictment under the prede-
cessor statute and not with what proof was necessary for conviction."' 1
48
The distinction drawn is at best a slender reed. There appears to be no
substantive distinction between the elements which must be alleged in
an indictment and the elements which must thereafter be proven at
trial. The courts in Meyers and Baker were performing the same task of
defining what is meant by the statutory phrase "putting life in jeop-
ardy." Their conclusions are in obvious conflict.
Second, the Baker rationale is objectionable because it derogates a
fundamental principle of statutory construction. It is generally accepted
that statutes should be construed to give effect to each section and
phrase of a statute.' 49 The practical effect of the Baker court's interpre-
tation of the Federal Bank Robbery Act, however, is to leave little dis-
tinction between the underlying and aggravated offenses. Since an
overwhelming number of bank robberies include the use of a gun, prac-
tically every robbery by fear or intimidation, which Congress sought to
address in passing the Act, will now also be punishable as jeopardizing
life. While it is true that the Baker court limited its holding to a state-
ment that guns per se jeopardize life, the argument that "a highly
charged atmosphere and the possibility of actions by employees" endan-
gers life proves too much. Carried to the extreme, the argument causes
most conceivable violations of sections 2113(a) or 2113(b) to offend sec-
tion 2113(d) also.' 50
147 Id.
148 Baker, 412 F.2d at 1072 n.4.
149 A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06, at 63 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1973).
150 United States o. Cooper, 462 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972) illus-
trates the expansion of the Baker decision beyond the stated holding that "a gun is a matter of
law a dangerous weapon." Baker, 412 F.2d at 1072. Faced with a bank robbery performed
with a simulated bomb, the Cooper court held that Baker was controlling on whether a convic-
tion under section 2113(d) would stand. The court analogized the fake bomb to the unloaded
gun-both have present the "apparent capacity to carry out harm," and create "a highly
charged atmosphere." Thus, life was in fact jeopardized. Cooper, 462 F.2d at 1344-45. Such a
rationale could readily support an aggravated offense conviction any time an individual com-
mitted the underlying offense of robbery by force, violence, or intimidation. Any time that a
robber enters a bank and threatens harm to a teller, a highly charged atmosphere is created
and other employees may be tempted to retaliate. Furthermore, even if the robber only
threatened to strike a teller if they did not "hand over the money," it could be said that he
manifested "a capacity to harm." Thus, section 2113(a) could, by extension of the Baker
rationale, be merged into section 2113(d).
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A third and somewhat remote criticism of the Baker construction is
that it will have the adverse effect of encouraging would-be bank rob-
bers who are knowledgeable about the law to use a loaded gun in the
crime. 15 1 When faced with the possibility of receiving the same punish-
ment, regardless of whether a loaded or unloaded gun is used, an indi-
vidual planning a robbery may be encouraged to carry a loaded weapon
into the bank and thus provide a means of defense and retaliation in the
event of "action by employees or others to prevent the robbery . . 152
The net effect could actually be to heighten the probability of serious
injury or death for bank tellers or other victims of the robbery. 153
Fourth, on a more immediate level, in the case of a court accepting
the permissible inference that use of a gun evidences that the gun is
loaded, the Bakerper se rule flies in the face of the Winshz requirement
that the prosecution prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt.
I 54
By proclaiming that as a matter of law a gun is a dangerous weapon
which objectively places life in danger, the court in effect creates a con-
clusive presumption, thus closing all argument on the issue.' 55 Even if
the defendant were to introduce evidence to prove that the weapon used
was not loaded or was inoperable, the irrebuttable presumption erected
by the court would prohibit the conclusion that life was not jeopardized
151 For general discussions on the validity of the deterrence theory of criminal justice, see
TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION, 247-55 (1960); Ball, The Deterrence Concept in
Criminology and Law, 46 J. GRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 347 (1955).
152 Baker, 412 F.2d at 1072.
153 For a delineation of this "stepladder" theory of punishment as applied to robbery and
armed robbery, see F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN
CRIME CONTROL 204-07 (1973). Forjustification of heightened penalties based on the sever-
ity of crimes, see J. BENTHAM, 1 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 397 (1843).
154 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit continues to apply the
Winship principle in other contexts, as evidenced by the recent decision of Tyler . Phels, 622
F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1980), a.d on reh g, 643 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1981), in which the jury was
charged in the course of a murder case that "'the defendant intended the natural and prob-
able consequences of his acts."' Id. at 175. In holding the charges unconstitutional because
the ultimate burden of proof was shifted to the defendant, Judge Kravitch noted:
The jury charge, however, required the jury to infer malice aforethought from proof of
an intentional and unlawful killing unless the defendant proved that he acted in the heat
of passion on sudden provocation.
The Supreme Court held such a charge to be unconstitutional because it permits the
jury to convict a defendant of murder even though it is as likey as not that he was guilty
of manslaughter. 421 U.S. at 703, 95 S. Ct. at 1892 (emphasis in original). . . .Thus,
Tyler could have been convicted of first degree murder even though it is as likely as not
that he did not intend to kill or do great bodily harm to more than one person. This is
an unacceptable possibility under the ruling of Mullaney v. Wilber.
Id. at 175-76 n.4.
155 The Fifth Circuit affirmed this conclusion in United States v. Cooper, 462 F.2d 1343
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972), which held that a simulated bomb, like an un-
loaded gun, created a dangerous environment which objectively jeopardized life. Id. at 1344-
45; see also supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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by the defendant's "use of a dangerous weapon. ' 156 Mandatory or con-
clusive presumptions, according to the Supreme Court in Ulster County,
are subject to the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 15 7
The Baker presumption clearly does not reach that standard in view of
the many robberies performed with unloaded guns and without the
likely intervention of police or bank guards. 158 Thus, the logic of Baker
does not merely shift the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding an
essential element to the defendant, but actually removes the element
altogether and bars the defendant from offering evidence which could
preclude conviction for aggravated bank robbery.
In summary, the Supreme Court, through the cases of Winship, Mul-
laney v. Wilbur, Patterson v. New York, and Sandstrom v. Montana, has pro-
nounced and reaffirmed the principle that the prosecution must bear the
heavy burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every essential ele-
ment of a crime. The obvious tension between this principle and the
holding of Ulster County Court v. Allen that permissive inferences need
only meet the "more-likely-than-not" standard is manifested in various
cases arising under the Federal Bank Robbery Act. In these cases,
courts have allowed inferences that the use of a gun suggests the gun is
loaded and that aiding the robbery suggests knowledge that a dangerous
weapon would be used. 159 The practical effect of these decisions is to
permit the conviction of defendants for the aggravated offense of jeop-
ardizing life on the basis of evidence falling short of the demands of a
"reasonable-doubt" standard.
A practical explanation for the Supreme Court's seeming departure
in Patterson from a broad outworking of the Winship principle was a de-
sire to preserve legislatures' liberty to determine what elements should
be included in statutory criminal offenses.160 While it has been ex-
plained above that the construction of the Federal Bank Robbery Act in
Baker v. United States actually creates an irrebuttable presumption that a
gun objectively jeopardizes life, alternatively it could be stated that the
Baker court merely construed the statute to eliminate a requirement that
the gun be loaded and operable.' 6' A clear lesson flowing from the Pat-
terson decision is that the determination of which elements should be
included in the definition of an offense is predominately a task reserved
for the legislative branch. 162 Thus, if a legislature finds that in a case-
156 See supra note 155.
157 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
158 See supra note 129.
159 See cases cited supra note 124.
160 See supra text accompanying note 82.
161 This conclusion is premised on the assertion that prior to Baker the Fifth Circuit did
require that the gun be loaded and operable. See supra text accompanying note 145.
162 This is evidenced by Justice White's statement in Patterson expressing the Court's desire
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by-case application of a particular statute too onerous a burden has
been placed on the state for proving a violation, the legislature is free to
redraft the statute and eliminate certain burdensome elements of the
offense within the broad requirements of due process and within the
necessary, practical limitations of the political process.' 63 If Congress
determines that the use of a gun, loaded or unloaded, is sufficient to
punish an accused for an aggravated bank robbery offense, it remains
free to rewrite the Federal Bank Robbery Act and thereby declare that
intention.
The most disappointing ramification of Baker v. United States is the
judicial assumption of the task of redrafting the statute with total disre-
gard for a basic canon of statutory construction. 64 Equally disconcert-
ing is the fact that the court in this process is insulated from the
constraints of the political process which would operate upon a legisla-
ture in its decision to reword the statute. 165 Furthermore, the court
through its assumption of legislative powers arguably denies the defend-
ant's due process right to have every element of the crime proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
Whether the Supreme Court will resolve the continuing conflict be-
tween the "reasonable-doubt" standard and the probability standard of
"more-likely-than-not" as they are imposed upon permissive inferences
remains to be seen. While the sanctioning of the permissive inference on
a lower basis of probability serves as a convenient tool for developing
evidence necessary for convictions, other values must also be recognized.
The words of Justice Douglas in his dissent to Barnes v. United States re-
main relevant in this context:
The step we take today will be applauded by prosecutors, as it makes their
way easy. But the Bill of Rights was designed to make the job of the prose-
cutor difficult. There is a presumption of innocence. Proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt is necessary. . . . These basic principles make the use of
these easy presumptions dangerous.' 66
that legislative attempts to reform criminal justice administration through statutory drafting
not be hampered by judicial intervention. 432 U.S. 197, 214-15 n.15;seealsosupra text accom-
panying note 82.
163 For an articulation of the substantive restraints of due process imposed on legislators in
their determinations of elements to be included in an offense, see Jeffries & Stephan, supra
note 1, at 1370-76.
164 Se supra note 151 and accompanying text.
165 Professor Underwood, in her defense of the procedural interpretation of Winship, notes
the restraints imposed upon legislatures through the political process in their drafting of crim-
inal statutes. Underwood, supra note 84, at 1318-19. Courts in their construction of statutes
are to a large extent sheltered from these political checks.
166 412 U.S. 837, 852 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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V. CONCLUSION
The operation of a society's criminal justice system can be seen as a
barometer of the political freedom enjoyed by its citizens. Moreover,
the criminal justice system may be validly measured by the separation
maintained between the executive and judicial functions of government.
If a breakdown were to occur in that system, as Chief Justice Burger
warns, 167 it may first present itself as an increasing deference by the ju-
diciary to the prosecutor. Because the United States prides itself on an
independent judiciary and on a rule of law, limitations upon the state's
power to criminalize and prosecute "bad" conduct, particularly those
limitations embodied in the due process clauses of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments, necessarily will be controversial. Judges are subject
to the same tension between public opinion, often generated or ex-
pressed by the executive branch, and perceived requirements of the law.
Rarely is there an identifiable point in time marking the beginning
of the jeopardy of political freedoms as might be indicated by courts
relinquishing their role and deferring their independence to the needs
and claims of the public prosecutor. The process is gradual, the political
transition uncelebrated. Certainly, participants in bank robberies, one
of the most common serious crimes, are unsympathetic and unlikely
"victims of injustice." This Article's suggestion that the continued insis-
tence by some judges in the Ninth and First Circuits that bank robbery
"lookouts" and "wheelmen" not be convicted of placing lives in jeop-
ardy without sufficient proof of their mens rea, 168 and the acknowledg-
ment by the Eighth and Second Circuits that Congress legislated an
enhanced penalty only when lives objectively are placed in danger, 169
represent the minority view. This suggestion signals in a microcosm of
the justice system that the judiciary may be surrendering-or never has
fully asserted-its independence and its authority.
167 N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1982, at 5, Col. 2.
168 United States v. Sanborn, 563 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Short, 493 F.2d
1170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 (1974).
169 United States v. Cobb, 558 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Marshall, 427
F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1970).
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